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ABSTRACT

The evaluation of rewards and costs incurred in the context of interaction is central to equity and exchange theories of interpersonal behavior; however, the question of how this assessment is affected by the anticipation of future interaction has not been directly investigated. If the maintenance of equity in relationships is important, then the implication of future interaction with another may lead to a more careful consideration of current contributions to interaction. It was hypothesized that persons would be more accurate in their estimation of current rewards exchanged with another if future interaction with that other was anticipated than if interaction was expected to end. In the context of a dyadic bargaining situation, female subjects (N=79) either anticipated future interaction with the same partner, a different partner, or expected no future interaction. The findings supported the hypothesized effect. Subjects who anticipated future interaction with the same partner more accurately estimated current rewards exchanged than did either subjects who anticipated future interaction with a different partner or subjects who anticipated no future interaction. The findings suggest that accuracy in the assessment of contributions to interaction seems to be strongly affected by the anticipation of future interaction. (Author/JAC)

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Anticipation of Future Interaction and the Estimation of Current Rewards

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Running head: Estimation of Current Rewards

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Anticipation of Future Interaction and the Estimation of Current Rewards

Many of life's situations are ones in which a person's outcomes are not solely a function of his own behaviors. Instead, one's own rewards are to some extent determined by the actions of others. Relationships with dates, mates, friends, and colleagues are all of this nature--situations in which a process of behavior exchange takes place and patterns of reciprocal reward develop. Such interactions have been conceptualized as ones of dependency (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

The patterns of reciprocal reward which emerge during social interaction have been the main focus of exchange theories of interpersonal attraction (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). According to these formulations, an individual's outcome in a relationship is equal to his received rewards minus his incurred costs. Rewards and costs refer to the positive and negative aspects of that particular relationship. Thibaut and Kelley

additionally state that interaction is most likely to continue if experienced outcomes meet the standards of acceptability that both persons have formed as a function of their experience with other relationships.

The work of Adams (e.g., Adams, 1965; Adams & Freeman, 1976) and the extension of his propositions by Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1976) have further emphasized that the perceived adequacy of outcomes is greatly influenced by conceptions of equity and justice with regard to the exchange process. Indeed, that a wide range of phenomena in the area of interpersonal relations can be accounted for in terms of equity and exchange models seems to be well-documented by these authors.

Central to the concerns of equity models of social exchange is the manner in which individuals judge the magnitude of rewards given and received in their relationship with others. Evidence, however, pertaining to variables which may affect this perceptual process is conspicuously sparse. The strong possibility exists that subjective estimates of the magnitude of rewards given and received in a relationship with another often may not be in veridical agreement with the actual and objective reward magnitude. If this is the case, then a specification of the variables which may systematically affect such estimates of reward magnitude is critical to

prediction of behavior from social exchange theories.

One major factor which might exert a strong influence on the perception of the relative reward contributions in interaction with another is whether or not the parties involved anticipate continuing future interaction. Continued interaction between two individuals is illustrative of what Heider (1958) has referred to as a positive unit relation. Heider further states that balance in the dyad is dependent on unit and sentiment relations being of the same sign. Balance theory thus suggests that an individual's perception of a unit relation with another may result in increased liking for that other due to the desire to achieve consistency or harmony between the unit and sentiment relations. If anticipation of future interaction leads to an increase in attraction, then it is likely that the estimation of the magnitude of rewards exchanged in interaction might also be affected. But <u>how</u> is this estimation affected? Does the anticipation of continuing interaction lead to an overestimation of reward received?

Studies by Berscheid and her colleagues suggest that the anticipation of future interaction, in the absence of prior interaction, tends to produce an increase in attraction. Darley and Berscheid (1967), for example, required subjects to commit themselves to several

discussion sessions with another person on an intimate topic. In this study, subjects read an ambiguous personality description of their supposed partner and another female, and made personality trait judgments about each of these others. These authors found an increase in attraction toward another with whom subjects anticipated interaction as compared to another with whom they did not anticipate interaction. Berscheid, Boye, and Darley (1968), in a study in which subjects anticipated discussing "attitudes toward marriage" with another, similarly found that participants distorted in a favorable direction the personality traits of their anticipated partner which they judged as important for her to have. These findings are also consistent with the results of a recent investigation by Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, and Dermer (1976). In the context of a study of heterosexual dating relationships, these authors found that as the amount of anticipated interaction with another increased, subjects more favorably evaluated that other.

It should be noted that in none of these studies did subjects have any actual prior interaction with their partners. Thus, whether or not the attraction effect which occurred would be limited by prior contact remains an unanswered question. It would seem that it might be very risky to distort incoming information about the

probable magnitude of reward if one expects further interaction which may present contradictory evidence. Suggestive in this respect are the results of a study by Walser, Berscheid, and Barclay (1967). These authors found, when they asked nursery school children to choose between two toys, that after the decision the children distorted their liking for whichever alternative (the chosen or rejected toy) about which they would not receive future objective information.

Obviously, it is indeed a long inferential jump from toys to other persons. If, however, the maintenance of equity in relationships is important, then it would seem that the implication of future interaction with another would lead to a more careful consideration of one's own and the other's contributions to the relationship. Kelly (1972) has observed that a perceiver's goal in attending to the behavior of others is to maximize his chances of exerting effective control over himself and the environment. Berscheid et al. (1976) have further noted that those others whose behaviors are most likely to receive careful scrutiny by a perceiver are those who are likely to pose control problems--novel or unfamiliar persons, and persons who are important, i.e. whose behavior may influence the rewards and punishments received by the perceiver. Specifically, if one's outcomes are dependent upon the

behavior of another, then careful scrutiny of the behavior of that other should ensue. Additionally, increases in outcome dependency should also be accompanied by an increase in attention to the behavior of the other.

Related to these considerations is additional suggestive evidence presented by Taylor, Altman, and Sorrentino (1969) and Layton and Insko (1974). Taylor et al. led Navy men to expect that they would be living and working with another in an undersea capsule for either three weeks or six months. Sailors in the three week condition were told that after this time, they would be given the opportunity to choose another partner. After an initial period of interaction, sociometric ratings of partners were taken. While the authors did not present means or report analysis of differences between these two conditions, they did state that subjects in the three week withdrawal condition evaluated their partner more favorably than did subjects in the six month condition. This pattern of results tends to indicate a greater propensity for distortion under conditions in which a long period of interaction is not necessarily forthcoming. Layton and Insko also found that a subject's perception of attitude similarity between himself and another had a greater positive effect on liking, desire to work with, and rewards expected from

possible social interaction with that other when no actual future interaction with the other was anticipated. Layton and Insko interpreted the attenuation of the similarity-attraction effect in the anticipation of future interaction condition as being most likely due to subjects' expectations of obtaining additional information about their partner in the upcoming interaction session.

Further implications concerning the nature of individuals' assessments of their own and others' contributions to interaction are apparent in the findings of balance theory research involving subjects' pleasantness ratings of hypothetical social situations. Typically, subjects have been asked to place themselves in the role of a person (P) who either likes or dislikes another person (O) and who either agrees or disagrees with O regarding some impersonal entity (X) important to both P and O. Recent studies utilizing this paradigm (Alderman, 1969; Gutman & Knox, 1972; Insko, Songer & McGarvey, 1974; Miller & Norman, 1976) have indicated that the specification of a unit relation (continuing interaction) between P and O augments the effects of agreement (between P and O about X) and attraction (liking between P and O) on pleasantness ratings. If these results can be generalized to actual social encounters, then the increased importance of agreement

and attraction in situations involving continued future interaction might be expected to cause the parties involved to more carefully scrutinize elements of the relationship which are indicative of the presence of agreement and attraction--principally their respective contributions to interaction.

A clear specification of the effects of anticipation of future interaction on the accuracy of estimates of rewards exchanged would seem to require a design in which subjects engage in interaction with another and either expect the interaction to continue or end, and in which the rewards provided by the other person are experienced. The present experiment was designed to incorporate the above features in a dyadic bargaining situation. Specifically, it was predicted that subjects who anticipated future interaction involving continued outcome dependency with the same partner in a similar situation would be more accurate in their assessment of rewards exchanged in initial interaction than either subjects who anticipated future interaction with a different partner or subjects who anticipated no future interaction.

Method

Subjects

Subjects were 80 females at a midwestern women's college who

were contacted by telephone and asked to participate in an experiment concerning the dynamics of small group interaction. Subjects were additionally informed that they could possibly win twenty-five dollars in the experiment. One subject's data were discarded due to the fact that errors and omissions in the completion of the dependent measures made it impossible to code her responses. Thus, the data for 79 participants were included in the analysis, 20 in each of three conditions, and 19 in a fourth condition.

Procedure

Subjects participated in the experiment one at a time and were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Upon arrival at the experimental room, subjects were seated on one side of a two-person booth. A partition in the center of this booth prevented visual contact with anyone seated on the opposite side. Subjects were told that the experiment would begin as soon as the other participant, who had agreed to come that hour, arrived. Shortly, a female confederate of the experimenter arrived and was seated on the opposite side of the booth.

After thanking the participants for coming, the experimenter explained that the purpose of the experiment was to assess the types of strategies persons use in bargaining situations. The participants subsequently

engaged in a ticket-passing task similar in form to one utilized by Miller, Boye, and Gerard (Note 1) and by Dion and Earn (1975). In this task subjects communicated with their partner via a series of coded tickets using a point system ranging from -10 to +10 (excluding 0). Participants were told that the object of the task was to accumulate as many points as possible, and that the three persons among all those engaging in the bargaining sessions getting the highest number of points in this task (positive points minus negative points) would each receive a twenty-five dollar prize. Participants were each given a supply of 60 tickets which the two subsequently exchanged one at a time through slots in the partition separating them. On each of the 60 trials, subjects wrote the number of points they wished to send their partner on one ticket and delivered it through a slot in the partition. The confederate-partner, using one of her tickets, then sent points back in the same manner. Participants were instructed to look briefly at the ticket they received from their partner, place that ticket in a "return" slot on the side of their booth, and then again send another ticket to their partner. Tickets placed in the return slot dropped into a box on the outside of the booth and were not thereafter accessible to either participant. Thus, subjects were prevented from keeping a continuous tally of points

received and sent. Subjects were also requested not to talk to each other during the bargaining session. The experimenter timed the length of the bargaining session, and the confederate also timed her ticket passes, making one 10 seconds after receiving each ticket from the subject.

No future interaction condition. Subjects in this condition were told that they would engage in only one bargaining session. The confederate delivered a preprogrammed random permutation of predominantly positive points totalling +255 over the 60 trials to the subjects.

Future interaction-same partner condition. Subjects in this condition were told that they would be participating in another bargaining session in a second phase of the experiment and that they would have the same partner during that session. Participants were also informed that additional twenty-five dollar prizes would be awarded to each of the three persons among all bargainers who achieved the highest number of points in this second phase. Again the confederate delivered a random permutation of predominantly positive points totalling +255 over the 60 trials. The fact that subjects would have the same partner during the second session was emphasized twice during the instructions--once at the beginning of the explanation of the task and

once immediately before the beginning of the bargaining session.

Future interaction-different partner condition. Subjects in this condition received the same instructions and points as future interaction-same partner subjects with the exception that the experimenter stressed that in the second session they would have a different partner.

No future interaction-control condition. Subjects in this condition received the same instructions as no future interaction subjects; however, the confederate delivered a preprogrammed random permutation of predominantly negative points totalling -63 to these subjects over the 60 trials. This condition was included in order to assess whether or not the points exchanged were actually perceived as carrying reward value. It was hypothesized that if indeed this was the case, then these subjects should rate their partners less favorably in terms of liking and social desirability than subjects in the no future interaction condition who received predominantly positive points.

Dependent measures. At the conclusion of the bargaining session, the experimenter again stressed to no future interaction subjects that bargaining was at an end and to participants in both future interaction conditions that they would participate in a second session with either the same or a different partner, as

was appropriate. All participants were then requested to fill out a questionnaire concerning their own and their partner's bargaining behavior.

The first set of items in the questionnaire asked participants to estimate the net total points that they received from and sent to their partner. Subjects in both future interaction conditions were additionally asked to estimate the net total of points that they expected to receive from and send to their partner in the second bargaining session.

The next set of items dealt with the participant's perceptions of the task and were presented in a 6-point rating scale format. These items requested subjects to assess the degree to which they were trying hard to get high points from their partner, the degree to which they felt satisfied when (or if) their strategy got them high points, the degree to which they saw the bargaining situation as competitive, the degree to which they felt the situation was interesting, the degree to which they saw their partner's strategy as competitive, the degree to which they felt their own strategy was competitive, and the degree to which they felt it was important to get as many points as possible from their partner.

A final set of 28 items required participants to make personality assessments of their partners. An introductory set of instructions stressed that responses

were anonymous and that frank evaluations were needed. These items were presented as 6-point semantic differential scales and were randomly ordered across subjects and conditions. Fourteen of these scales constituted a Social Desirability Index (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972) and included the following items: poised/awkward, modest/vain, strong/weak, interesting/boring, self assertive/submissive, sociable/unsociable, independent/dependent, warm/cold, genuine/artificial, kind/cruel, exciting/dull, sexually warm/sexually cold, sincere/insincere, and sensitive/insensitive.

Participants were instructed not to put their name on the questionnaire and to seal it, when finished, in a manila envelope provided for that purpose. The experimenter further assured subjects that questionnaire responses would be anonymous.

In actuality, only one bargaining session occurred. After the sealed questionnaires were collected, subjects were informed of the true interests of the study, pledged to secrecy, and paid a bonus of $1.00 for their participation in that session. Additionally, six twenty-five dollar cash prizes were awarded via a random drawing among all subjects at the end of the entire experiment. All subjects further received a letter stating the names of the prize-winners and the findings of the study.

Results

Manipulation Check

In order for the experimental situation to model one in which persons exchange rewards in the context of interaction, it was obviously important for subjects to perceive the points they were exchanging as having reward value. It was reasoned that if indeed these points were valued, subjects in the no future interaction control condition who received a distribution of predominantly negative points should rate their partners as less likable and less socially desirable than subjects who also expected no future interaction, but who received a distribution of predominantly positive points. Analyses of subjects' ratings of their partners on these measures generally supported this prediction. The means associated with these analyses are presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here

No future interaction-negative reward subjects rated their partners as less likable than subjects in the no future interaction-positive reward condition, F (1,37) = 8.47, $p<.01$. There was also a tendency for subjects receiving negative points to rate their partners as less socially desirable than subjects receiving positive points, F (1,37) = 2.10, p = .155. These two groups also

differed in their perceptions of equity in the exchange. Specifically, no future interaction-negative reward subjects perceived inequity (amount subjects estimated they received minus the amount they estimated they sent) in their partner's favor (M = -23.84. t (18) = -2.66, $p<.05$), whereas no future interaction-positive reward subjects did not perceive a differential in the exchange (M = 12.8, t (19) = .56, ns). These results do support the assumption that the points exchanged were valued by participants.

Subjects responses in the three positive reward experimental conditions on these measures were also compared. Partners were not rated as differentially likable (F (2,57) = .21, p = .81) or socially desirable (F (2,57) = .79, p = .46) as a function of these conditions.

Ratings of the Bargaining Situation

Before considering analyses of subjects' estimates of rewards exchanged, it is essential to know how the bargaining situation was perceived by them. The means pertaining to participants' self reports of their behavior during the bargaining session and perceptions of the task and bargaining strategy of their partner are presented in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 about here

An examination of the marginal means reveals that all are below the midpoint of the scales used, indicating that overall, subjects: 1) were trying hard to use a strategy that would get them high points from their partner; 2) felt satisfied and rewarded when (or if) their strategy got them high points; 3) felt that the bargaining situation was competitive; 4) felt that the task was interesting; 5) felt that their bargaining strategy was competitive; 6) felt that their partner's bargaining strategy was competitive; and 7) felt that it was important to get as many points as possible from their partner.

Analysis of subjects' ratings of the bargaining situation on these dimensions in the three comparable positive reward conditions indicated significant differences on two of these variables--the degree to which the situation was perceived as interesting (F (2,57) = 5.64, $p<.01$) and the degree to which a partner's bargaining strategy was perceived as competitive (F (2,57) = 3.47, $p<.05$).[1] Specifically, both anticipation-same partner subjects and no future interaction subjects rated the task as more interesting than subjects who anticipated future interaction with a different partner (F (1,57) = 6.61, $p<.05$ and F (1,57)

= 9.95, $p<.01$, respectively). Anticipation-same partner subjects did not rate the bargaining situation as more interesting than no future interaction subjects (F (1,57) = .341, ns).

This same pattern of results was also found with regard to subjects' perceptions of the competitiveness of their partner's bargaining strategy. Anticipation-same partner subjects and no future interaction subjects did not rate their partners as differentially competitive (F (1,57) = .148, ns), whereas both groups rated their partners as more competitive than subjects who anticipated future interaction with a different partner (F (1,57) = 5.94, $p<.05$ and F (1,57) = 4.21, $p<.05$, respectively). No significant differences between the no future interaction-positive reward and no future interaction-negative reward groups were found on any of these variables.

Estimates of Rewards Exchanged, Bargaining Session 1

Subjects' estimates of rewards exchanged were analyzed as a function of the between groups factor, anticipation of future interaction (anticipation-same partner, anticipation-different partner, no future interaction), as well as the within groups factor, type of estimation (estimation of amount received, estimation of amount sent).

First, it should be noted that there appeared to be

no reliable differences between anticipation-same partner, anticipation-different partner, and no future interaction groups with regard to the amount of reward actually sent by these subjects to their partners (F (2,57) = 1.75, p = .19, ns). It will be recalled that subjects in all three conditions did in actuality receive the same amount from their partners during the bargaining session. The major dependent variables of interest were subjects' estimates of the magnitude of rewards they received and their estimates of the rewards they gave. It was hypothesized that anticipation-same partner subjects would be more accurate in their estimates than either anticipation-different partner subjects or no future interaction subjects. Analysis of subjects' errors of estimation supported this prediction, revealing an anticipation of future interaction main effect (F (2,57) = 5.72, $p<.01$). The means associated with these analyses are presented in Table 3.

Insert Table 3 about here

In accord with the hypothesis, subjects who anticipated future interaction with the same partner more accurately estimated the magnitude of rewards received and sent than did either subjects who anticipated future interaction with a different partner (F (1,57) = 7.10,

$p<.01$) or subjects who anticipated no future interaction (F (1,57) = 9.83, $p<.01$). These latter two groups did not significantly differ (F (1,57 = .22 ns). A significant main effect was also evidenced for the within groups estimation factor (F (1,57) = 44.36, $p<.001$), indicating that subjects were much more accurate in estimating rewards received than rewards sent.

Examination of the marginal means in Table 3 with respect to subjects' estimates of rewards received and rewards sent revealed a similar pattern of differences. There was an overall tendency for subjects to ove.- estimate both rewards received and rewards sent as both marginals are significantly different from zero (t (59) = 8.27. $p<.01$ and t (59) = 9.68, $p<.01$, respectively).[2] However, subjects were much more prone to overestimate rewards sent than rewards received (t (59) = 7.93, $p<.01$).

Subjects' actual estimates of rewards received and sent in the first bargaining session are also presented in Table 3. Inspection of these means would seem to indicate that anticipation-same partner subjects perceived that they sent more than they received, whereas the reverse appears true for the other two groups. This interaction was not significant, however (F (2,57) = 1.63, p = .21). Thus, it cannot be said that a differential pattern of equity was perceived among these

three groups. Analysis of these estimates did evidence an anticipation of future interaction main effect (F (2,57) = 5.12, $p<.01$). Specifically, anticipation-same partner subjects tended to estimate that a lesser total amount of rewards were sent and received than anticipation-different partner subjects (F (1,57) = 4.53, $p<.05$) or no future interaction subjects (F (1,57) = 9.8, $p<.01$). These latter two groups did not significantly differ (F (1,57) = 1.01, ns).

It was also reasoned that accuracy differences, if detected between the experimental groups, might also be reflected in the time spent in the bargaining session. If accuracy was related to attentional differences, then attentional variation might be evidenced in the time spent receiving and sending rewards. Mean times in seconds spent in bargaining session for anticipation-same partner, anticipation-different partner, and no future interaction subjects were 1048.8, 988.05, and 1017.95 respectively. These differences, however, were not significant.

Projections of Reward Exchange, Bargaining Session 2

Participants who anticipated future interaction with the same or a different partner were also asked to estimate the rewards they would send and receive in the second bargaining session. The means associated with these estimates are presented in Table 4.

Insert Table 4 about here

Whereas there were no reliable differences in projected amounts to be sent (F (1,38) = 2.16, p = .15) or received (F (1,38) = .06, p = .81), subjects who anticipated future interaction with the same partner expected to receive a greater increase in rewards over their estimates of amount received in the first session (M = 56.5) than did subjects who anticipated future interaction with a different partner (M = -25.5; F (1,38) = 8.16, $p<.01$). Also evident was a corresponding tendency for anticipation-same partner subjects to project a greater increase over first session estimates in the amount of reward they would send in the second session (M = 66) than anticipation-different partner subjects (M = -1.65; F (1,38) = 3.72, $p<.07$).

If inequity was perceived in the first bargaining session, subjects in the anticipation-same partner condition were the only ones for which equity restoration was possible. Considering anticipation-same partner subjects' estimates alone, these subjects did not significantly overestimate the amount of reward they received in the first bargaining session (t (19) = .43, ns) but did overestimate the amount of reward they sent (t (19) = 3.02, $p<.01$). However, no significant difference was found between reported estimates of

amounts received and sent by these subjects in the first bargaining session (M = 19.5; t (19) = .78, ns). Similarly, no significant difference was found between anticipation-same partner subjects' projections of the amounts they would receive and send in the second session (M = 29.5, t = 1.2, ns). It should be noted, however, that these subjects in actuality did generally receive more than they sent in bargaining session one (M = 58.6; t (19) = 2.43, $p<.05$). This was also true for anticipation-different partner and no future interaction subjects (M = 119.2, t (19) = 7.69, $p<.01$ and M = 92.7, t (19) = 3.01, $p<.01$, respectively).

Discussion

Accuracy in the assessment of contributions to interaction does seem to be strongly affected by the anticipation of future interaction. Participants in this study who anticipated subsequent interaction with the same partner more accurately estimated rewards received and sent than did either participants who anticipated future interaction with a different partner or participants who expected no future interaction. If the maintenance of equity in relationships is important (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1976) just such a result would be predicted. Careful consideration of the contributions to interaction by the parties involved when future interaction is expected should

permit these individuals to more accurately predict future outcomes and to more effectively alter their own behaviors so as to increase the probability of equitable future exchange. Additionally, distortion of another's behavior in situations involving future contact would seem to be a highly unsatisfactory tactic, as these inaccuracies would be subject to continual challenge by the realities of interaction with that other.

These results are also in partial agreement with the findings of Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, and Dermer (1976). These authors found, in the context of a study of heterosexual dating relationships, that as the amount of anticipated future interaction increased, subjects more accurately remembered details about another's behavior and more favorably evaluated that other. In the present study, anticipation of future interaction did relate similarly to accuracy, whereas favorability ratings, while in the same direction as those presented by Berscheid, et al., were not significantly different. These results are also at variance with the findings of Darley and Berscheid (1967) and Berscheid, Boye, and Darley (1968). These authors, it will be recalled, found that anticipation of future interaction, in the absence of prior interaction, produced an increase in attraction. In the present study, however, subjects engaged in actual interaction with their partner and either expected that

interaction to continue or end. It is thus likely that favorability ratings may be more closely related to perceived equity of exchange in interaction in the present study than to anticipation of future interaction. Since a differential pattern of perceived equity was not found between experimental conditions in the present study, it is not surprising that differences in favorability ratings did not exist. This interpretation is supported by the finding that when inequity in exchange was perceived by no future interaction-negative reward control subjects, significant differences in favorability ratings did emerge in comparison with no future interaction-positive reward participants who did not perceive inequity in the exchange.

The finding in the present study that subjects were more accurate in estimating rewards received than rewards sent additionally raises some interesting possibilities. Perhaps the most parsimonious explanation for these differences is that since participants expected monetary prizes to be awarded on the basis of the total points they received, this fact may have engendered more careful scrutiny of those rewards. Alternatively, this result may indicate a general tendency to more accurately estimate negative events presented by others than those presented by oneself, or a tendency to overvalue the positive events presented by oneself relative to those

presented by others. Unfortunately, the data in this study do not allow a discrimination between these alternatives.

Related to the above considerations is the unanswered question of whether subjects' estimates represent differential attention in the encoding of information or retrieval differences. Does anticipation of future interaction structure encoding during initial interaction or facilitate retrieval of stored information or both? Measures of time spent in bargaining, which might have supplied a clue with regard to attentional differences, did not evidence significance between conditions. These findings, it should be noted, are at variance with those presented by Berschied et al. (1976), which indicated that attention was a reliably increasing function of the amount of anticipated future interaction. It should be realized, however, that the Berscheid et al. subjects had only to view potential partners or non-partners in a videotaped discussion whereas subjects in the present study were actively engaged in interaction. It is possible that time differences may not be necessarily closely related to attentional differences in the latter situation.

No specific a priori predictions were made in the present experiment regarding subjects' projections of rewards to be exchanged in the second bargaining session.

It does, however, seem reasonable that subjects who anticipated future interaction with the same partner would try to increase the amount of reward they might receive in the second session. These subjects' projection of an increase in the amount of reward they would send their partners in the second session might be interpreted as a strategy designed to accomplish this end. An important question for future research concerns the degree to which the pattern of differential accuracy found in the present study influences the actual behavior of participants during subsequent encounters. If anticipation of future interaction leads to a more careful assessment of contributions to initial interaction, then future encounters might be expected to be characterized by a greater avoidance of conflict, and a faster resolution of conflict when it does occur.

A central concern of equity models of social exchange is the manner in which individuals judge the magnitude of rewards given and received in their relationships with others. The results of the present study strongly suggest that often these estimates may not be in veridical agreement with the objective magnitude of rewards exchanged. First, there seems to be a positivity bias in that an overall tendency to overestimate rewards exchanged was evident. Possibly this may be due to a general propensity for individuals to remember better

specific exchanges which are indicative of liking or agreement. Cottrell, Ingram, and Monfort (1971) have noted a similar finding in relation to the retention or learning of balanced or unbalanced cognitive structures. These authors found that balanced structures were remembered better and further that positive sentiment items were remembered better that negative sentiment items.

Second, participants were more accurate in their estimates of rewards they received than rewards they sent, being more likely to overestimate the latter than the former. Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1976) have suggested that participants are likely to evaluate rewards they themselves provide differently than do other participants or observers. The findings of the present experiment definitely lend support to that contention.

Finally, the present data serve to emphasize the importance of considering the context of interaction when making predictions concerning participants' assessments of rewards exchanged. Anticipation of continuing interaction with another resulted in a more accurate assessment of contributions to current interaction than when interaction with that other was expected to end.

Of what import is this differential pattern of accuracy for an understanding of ongoing social

relationships involving outcome dependency? Whereas the present experiment dealt specifically with a competitive bargaining situation, these results may also apply to long-term relationships other than no-choice, comtetitive encounters. Many ongoing relationships (e.g. friendships, intimate relationships) exist and continue as a function of the choice of the parties involved. Does the prospect of continuing interaction in such relationships lead similarly to accuracy in the assessment of rewards exchanged? Or does accommodation in these situations involve a distortion of the rewards provided in the direction of wish fulfillment? Obviously, an answer to this question awaits future research. The results of the present study, however, might suggest that if distortion does occur, it would be most likely along dimensions which could not be easily contradicted or challenged by the realities of future interaction. Many individual preferences may be examples of such dimensions. For example, it would be difficult for one to ignore the fact that one's mate does not behave in a jealous manner when one interacts with others of the opposite sex. Convincing oneself that whereas others may desire some jealousy on the part of a mate in such situations, one's own preference is for non-jealous behavior might be one way of maintaining a cognitively comfortable world, and at the same time maintaining an

accurate view of the behavior of a significant other. Intuitively, it would seem that such accuracy would indeed be very adaptive, permitting a greater amount of control over and prediction of subsequent interaction.

Reference Notes

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Footnotes

[1]It should be noted that a multivariate analysis of variance on these seven variables did not show evidence of a significant anticipation of future interaction effect (F (14,1-2) = 1.20, p = .17).

[2]All t-tests are two-tailed tests.

Table 1

Means of Social Desirability and Liking Ratings of Partners[a]

Anticipation of Future Interaction Condition

Measure		Same Partner[b]	Different Partner[b]	No Future Interaction[b]	No Future Interaction[c] (Negative Reward)
Social Desirability Index[d]	M	56.70	55.75	53.35	48.75
	SD	7.57	8.96	9.42	10.23
Liking[e]	M	4.55	4.45	4.35	3.47
	SD	.84	1.06	1.03	1.29

[a]The higher the number, the higher the rating

[b]n=20

[c]n=19

[d]The midpoint of this scale is 49.

[e]The midpoint of this scale is 3.5

Table 2

Means of Subject's Ratings[a] of the Bargaining Situation

Anticipation of Future Interaction Condition

Statement[d]		Same Partner[b]	Different Partner[b]	No Future Interaction[b]	No Future Interaction (Negative Reward)	Marginal Mean
1. Trying Hard	M	2.70	3.65	3.05	3.68	3.27
	SD	1.22	3.00	1.54	1.00	
2. Satisfying	M	2.60	3.00	2.90	2.68	2.79
	SD	1.31	1.52	1.37	1.20	
3. Bargaining Situation Competitive	M	2.30	2.15	2.15	2.40	2.25
	SD	1.30	1.35	1.46	1.42	
4. Situation Interesting	M	2.20	3.30	1.95	2.42	2.46
	SD	1.28	1.59	1.15	.96	
5. Own Bargaining Strategy Competitive	M	3.20	3.55	2.95	2.78	3.12
	SD	1.32	1.63	1.50	1.27	
6. Partner's Bargaining Strategy Competitive	M	2.50	3.45	2.65	2.57	2.79
	SD	1.00	1.50	1.14	1.12	
7. Important To Get Points	M	3.15	3.45	3.00	2.94	3.13
	SD	1.30	1.60	1.29	.84	

[a]The lower the number, the greater the agreement with the statement.

[b]$n=20$

[c]$n=19$

[d]All statements were evaluated by six point scales; the midpoint of each scale is thus 3.5.

Table 3

Means of Subjects' Estimates, Estimation Errors and Actual Values of Reward Received and Sent

		Anticipation of Future Interaction Condition			
		Same Partner[a]	Different Partner[a]	No Future Interaction[a]	Marginal Mean
Estimation Error,[b] Amount Received Session 1	M	44.00	81.05	90.75	71.9
	SD	35.19	44.66	51.56	
Estimation Error,[c] Amount Sent Session 1	M	101.9	163.0	170.65	146.85
	SD	104.12	74.7	93.44	
Total Estimation Error	M	145.9	244.05	261.4	
	SD	107.95	109.54	130.33	
Estimated Amount Received, Session 1	M	260.50	335.65	345.75	313.97
	SD	56.96	48.44	51.56	
Estimated Amount Sent, Session 1	M	280.00	299.30	332.95	304.08
	SD	123.22	91.34	107.34	
Total Amount Estimated Exchanged, Session 1	M	540.50	634.95	678.70	
	SD	158.17	123.04	134.79	
Amount Actually Received, Session 1		255	255	255	
Amount of Overestimate of Reward Received	M	5.50	80.65	90.75	58.96
	SD	56.96	48.44	51.56	
Amount Actually Sent, Session 1	M	196.40	131.25	162.30	163.31
	SD	107.81	69.52	137.54	
Amount of Overestimate of Reward Sent	M	83.60	168.05	170.65	140.76
	SD	96.03	74.70	93.44	

[a] $n=20$

[b] Mean of absolute value of the difference between subjects' estimates of amount they received and amount they actually received.

[c] Mean of absolute value of the difference between subjects' estimates of amount they sent and amount they actually sent.

Table 4

Means of Subjects' Projections of Amount of Reward To Be Exchanged, Session 2

Anticipation of Future Interaction Condition

		Same Partner[a]	Different Partner[a]
Projected Amount to Receive, Session 2	M	317.00	309.55
	SD	101.55	91.31
Projected Amount to Send, Session 2	M	346.50	297.65
	SD	120.42	86.94

[a] n=20

APPENDIX

ANOVA Summary Table
for Estimates of Rewards Received and Sent

Bargaining Session 1

Source	df	MS	F
Between			
A (Anticipation of Future Interaction)	2	99,579.95	5.12*
S(A)	57	19,433.61	
Within			
B (Type of Estimation)	1	5626.01	.59
A x B	2	15,408.52	1.63
B x S(A)	57	9432.81	

*p<.01

ANOVA Summary Table
for Errors of Estimation, Bargaining Session 1

Source	df	MS	F
Between			
A (Anticipation of Future Interaction	2	77,582.32	5.72*
S(A)	57	13,562.13	
Within			
B (Type of Estimation, Receive-Send)	1	321,933.75	44.36**
A x B	2	3555.35	.48
B x S(A)	57	7256.08	

*$p<.01$

**$p<.001$